Rape by Fraud: Eluding Washington Rape Statutes
Michael Mullen*
INTRODUCTION
Existing Washington law does not sufficiently safeguard its citizens
from “rape by fraud,” an action whereby a person obtains sexual consent
and has sexual intercourse of any type by fraud,1 deception,
misrepresentation, or impersonation.2 Rape by fraud is a form of sexual
predation not always prosecutable under existing Washington law.3 In
recent years, twelve states have adopted expanded rape by fraud statutory
provisions.4 Presently, Washington’s rape statutes lack the expansive rape
by fraud statutory language adopted by these twelve states.5 A recent
sexual scam in Seattle has revealed holes in Washington’s rape statutes.6
This Note examines the history of rape by fraud, considers criticisms
against expanding existing rape by fraud statutory provisions, and
concludes that Washington should adopt expansive rape by fraud statutory
provisions to better protect its citizens from sexual impersonation, sexual
scams, sexual theft, and sexual extortion.
Rape by fraud is perpetrated across six general categories (with some
overlap): (1) fraudulent treatment, (2) sexual impersonation, (3) sexual
scams, (4) sexual theft, (5) abuse of authority, and (6) sexual extortion.7
First, fraudulent treatment, perhaps the most prominent of the categories
* During the summer of 2016, I was a legal extern at the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office’s
(KCPAO) Special Assault Unit. During that summer, I witnessed some of the enormous challenges
that victims of sexual assault face in Washington. I was motivated to write this Note in hope of relief
for the many people affected by its subject matter. I would like to thank all the prosecutors and staff
at KCPAO for their mentorship and service to the community, especially Ms. Lisa Johnson, Ms.
Corinn Bohn, Mr. Hugh Barber, and Ms. Carla Carlstrom.
1. Fraud is “[a] knowing misrepresentation or knowing concealment of a material fact made to
induce another to act to his or her detriment.” Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
2. Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 48 (1998).
3. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.040, 9A.44.050, 9A.44.060 (2016).
4. See Jacqueline Syrnick, Challenging the Use of Fraud to Get into Bed After Suliveres v.
Commonwealth—A Call for Legislative Reform, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 321, 335–36 (2009).
5. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.040, 9A.44.050, 9A.44.060.
6. See infra notes 59–85 and accompanying text.
7. See Falk, supra note 2, at 52.
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in existing case law, is characterized by fraudulent medical, psychological,
psychiatric, and religious treatment used to obtain sexual intercourse.8
Many of the most infamous rape by deception cases involve unscrupulous
physicians convincing patients that sexual complicity is essential to or
helpful in providing a needed medical operation or diagnosis.9
Second, sexual impersonation involves someone who pretends to be
someone else to fraudulently obtain sexual intercourse.10 Impersonation of
a significant other is characteristic of this category;11 however, case law
also provides examples of defendants impersonating famous people to
obtain sexual intercourse.12
Third, sexual scams typically involve fraudsters targeting vulnerable
people, often impersonating agents or producers within the entertainment
industry, especially pornographic content production.13 Sexual scammers
sometimes use other techniques to fraudulently induce sexual complicity,
including operating under the guise of (bogus) scientific research and, in
one particularly bizarre case, posing as an entranced psychic and
demanding sex during a séance.14
Fourth, sexual theft involves one of the most controversial and
vulnerable classes of victims: sex workers.15 Case law is replete with this
archetypal description of sexual theft: someone approaches a sex worker,
offers money in exchange for sex, has sex, and subsequently refuses to
pay.16
Fifth, abuse of authority occurs when someone uses occupational or
social power to obtain sexual complicity.17 Typically, abuse of authority
cases involve defendants who utilize their positions as educators, police

8. Id. at 52–64.
9. See, e.g., Don Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356 (Mich. 1872).
10. See Falk, supra note 2, at 65–66.
11. See id. at 66–69. See generally People v. Hough, 607 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1994)
(holding that a woman consented to sexual intercourse with a man when he procured her consent by
impersonating her boyfriend, who was his twin brother, because New York’s non-consent statute
required proof of force or incapacity).
12. See Falk, supra note 2, at 69.
13. See id. at 70–74.
14. Id. at 75.
15. Id. at 76–79.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 79–84.
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officers,18 supervisors, and employers to leverage sexual complicity
against victims.19
Sixth, sexual extortion, which is often closely related to abuse of
authority, occurs when a perpetrator lacks a formal position of authority
but, nevertheless, exploits the power derived from his or her relationship
with the victim.20 Altogether, these six categories represent the scope of
rape by fraud examined in this Note.
Washington law affords basic criminal protections against fraudulent
treatment and abuse of authority, but it lacks the statutory language
necessary to adequately protect against impersonation, sexual scams,
sexual theft, and sexual extortion.21
Part I of this Note examines the disappointing history of rape by
fraud in courtrooms across the nation. Additionally, this Part reveals that
Washington rape statutes offer only limited power to prosecute rape by
fraud. Although most states have narrow rape statutes like Washington,
twelve states have adopted modern rape by fraud provisions that have
significantly expanded the protections afforded to victims whose sexual
consent was obtained by fraud. In Part II, this Note describes the various
statutory models offered by these twelve states and the Uniform Model
Penal Code. In Part III, this Note suggests that Washington should adopt
expanded rape by fraud statutory provisions to enhance human dignity and
gender equality, and it then considers and responds to criticisms against
such action.
I.

A LONG AND DISAPPOINTING HISTORY OF RAPE BY FRAUD LAW

Seminal cases illustrate the historical and ongoing inadequacies of
most states’ rape statutes. In Don Moran v. People,22 the defendant was a
doctor who told his patient, a fifteen-year-old girl, that she had to have sex
with him to save her life.23 Coerced by the defendant, the young girl
submitted.24 Although the trial court convicted the defendant of rape, the

18. In 2016, a former Oklahoma City police officer was convicted on eighteen of thirty-six
charges, including four counts of first-degree rape and four counts of oral sodomy; the jury
recommended a 263-year sentence because it believed the ex-officer used his authority to prey on
vulnerable women. Eliott C. McLaughlin, Sarah Sidner & Michael Martinez, Oklahoma City Cop
Convicted of Rape Sentenced to 263 Years in Prison, CNN (Jan. 22, 2016, 12:26 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/21/us/oklahoma-city-officer-daniel-holtzclaw-rape-sentencing/)
[https://perma.cc/63WW-BF6D].
19. See Falk, supra note 2, at 79–84.
20. Id. at 84.
21. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
22. Don Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356, 356 (Mich. 1872).
23. Id. at 357.
24. Id. at 357–58.
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Supreme Court of Michigan relied on a definition of rape25 that required
force against the victim and reversed judgment against the defendant for
lack of proof of force.26
Nearly a century later, the Doran Moran opinion was revitalized in
Commonwealth v. Goldenberg by requiring proof of physical force,
despite coercive and assaultive conduct.27 The defendant, a doctor, met
with an unmarried 19-year-old girl who was three months pregnant and
seeking an abortion.28 The defendant agreed to perform an abortion and
told the girl that the procedure would span three treatments.29 In the first
treatment, the defendant had the girl undress, and then he applied a
vibrator to her genitals.30 He then gave her two injections that stammered
her speech and made her feel delirious and unable to walk normally.31 In
the second treatment, the defendant, again, used a vibrator on her genitals
and gave her another two injections.32 He then told her that he had to have
sexual intercourse with her and that it “would help in some way.”33 She
did not tell the doctor no, but she felt dizzy, powerless, and unable to
control her body.34 The girl later spoke with her friend and mother,
describing the doctor’s actions.35 Resultantly, she did not return for the
third treatment and instead contacted the police.36 At trial, a jury found the
defendant guilty of rape.37 Afterward, the defendant appealed, and the
court set aside the verdict because there was no proof of force and “it could
not be found beyond a reasonable doubt that the intercourse was without
her consent.”38
Two decades later, in Goldberg v. State, the court continued to
require proof of force when another defendant faced rape charges after he
used a sexual scam to obtain sexual intercourse.39 The defendant, a 25year-old community college student, approached an 18-year-old girl and
told her that he was a “free-lance agent and thought she was an excellent

25. The court defined rape as “the unlawful carnal knowledge, by a man of a woman, forcibly
(or by force), and against her will[.]” Id. at 359.
26. Id. at 364–65.
27. See Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, 155 N.E.2d 187 (Mass. 1959).
28. Id. at 189.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 189–90.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 191.
39. See Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
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prospect to become a successful model.”40 The defendant showed her an
ID and convinced her that he was a genuine agent, so the girl agreed to
meet with him later, and he picked her up in a Cadillac Eldorado
(unbeknownst to the girl, the car belonged to his mother).41 The defendant
told her that he was taking her to “a temporary studio.”42 When they found
that the so-called studio was “closed,” he took her to a condominium that
he told her they could use instead.43 The girl testified that the defendant
led her to a bedroom with a large bed and a red velvet bedspread.44 The
defendant took off his shirt and continued trying to convince her that this
was all part of the modeling job, but “[she] knew that it wasn’t any
more.”45 Then, out of fear—she later testified that she was afraid that he
was going to kill her—she removed her clothes.46 The defendant pushed
her onto the bed and had sexual intercourse with her.47
At trial, a jury convicted the defendant of rape.48 The reviewing
court, however, reversed judgment because, in “the absence of actual
force, unreasonable subjective fear of resisting cannot convert the conduct
of the defendant from that which is non-criminal to that which is
criminal.”49
Almost thirty years later, a Massachusetts court reprised and
expanded the Commonwealth v. Goldenberg opinion in Suliveres v.
Commonwealth by holding that consent induced by fraudulent
impersonation did not amount to rape.50 In Suliveres, a female complainant
reported that the defendant had sexual intercourse with her and had
impersonated her boyfriend after he awakened her in a dark room.51 She
reported that when the defendant entered the dark room, she assumed that
person was her boyfriend—in fact, she addressed him by her boyfriend’s
name.52 Moreover, she reported that she was “‘not fully awake’ at the time
of penetration” and that, if she had known that the person in her room was
the defendant, she “‘would have never consented.’”53 The defendant
argued that the sex was consensual.54 Lacking any rape by fraud statutory
40. Id. at 1214.
41. Id. at 1215.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1214.
49. Id. at 1220.
50. See Suliveres v. Commonwealth, 865 N.E.2d 1086, 1091 (Mass. 2007).
51. Id. at 1088.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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provision, the jury was unable to reach a verdict and the judge declared a
mistrial.55 The defendant then moved for dismissal and the court denied
his motion.56 After the court denied his motion, the defendant sought relief
from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.57 The Court held that
“[f]raudulently obtaining consent to sexual intercourse does not constitute
rape as defined in our statute.”58
Today, similar statutory inadequacies persist in Washington. Six
women reported that a Seattle man, Mr. Matt Hickey, fraudulently posed
as a pornography recruiter and lured them to bogus auditions and nude
photography shoots where he coerced them into having sexual
intercourse.59 One twenty-year-old woman, Ms. Liz Shearer, alleged that
Mr. Hickey promised to guide her into the pornographic industry after a
sex audition “[t]o prove to production companies that having sex with
someone [she] didn’t know was something that [she] could handle.”60 Ms.
Shearer had never worked in pornography before, but she was struggling
financially working as a nanny, so she met Mr. Hickey in a hotel and
agreed to have sexual intercourse with him for the so-called audition.61
Afterward, Ms. Shearer reported that “if I had known what was going on,
I wouldn’t have.”62
Ms. Allysia Bishop reported that she had been similarly assaulted by
Mr. Hickey two years before Ms. Shearer’s experience. Ms. Bishop
reported that Mr. Hickey gave her a similar promise of guidance into the
pornographic industry, so she agreed to meet with him at his apartment.63
Ms. Bishop alleged that Mr. Hickey offered her numerous alcoholic
beverages and told her: “Well, we have to have sex, because if we don’t
then how am I going to know you’re for real and you’ll actually be able to
do this in the industry? So you have to prove to me you’re not going to
bail out.”64 Afterward, she reported that she would never have had sexual
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1089.
58. Id. at 1091.
59. See generally Info., State v. Hickey, No. 16-1-05400-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2016); Default
Judgment, State v. Hickey, No. 16-2-30379-0 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2016); Sydney Brownstone, The
Audition,
STRANGER
(June
8,
2016)
[hereinafter
Brownstown,
Audition],
http://www.thestranger.com/feature/2016/06/08/24182705/the-audition
[https://perma.cc/SZ8JN5JP]; Sydney Brownstone, Three Women Say Tech Journalist Matt Hickey Raped Them Outside of
“The Audition” Scam, STRANGER (July 20, 2016) [hereinafter Brownstown, Three Women Accuse
Matt Hickey], http://www.thestranger.com/features/2016/07/20/24361423/three-women-say-techjournalist-matt-hickey-raped-them-outside-of-the-audition-scam [https://perma.cc/Q6BK-R3XU].
60. See Brownstown, Audition, supra note 59.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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intercourse with him had she not thought that he was genuinely auditioning
her for work.65 Ms. Bishop left the so-called audition feeling upset and
violated.66 Later that same day, she slit her wrists in a bathtub; the cuts
were not fatal and she reported that she has tried to “move on.”67
At least seven other women have also reported that Mr. Hickey
sexually assaulted them using alcohol and deceptive pornographic
auditions to obtain sexual compliance.68
Following the reports against Mr. Hickey, The King County
Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (KCPAO) charged Mr. Hickey with three
counts of Rape in the Second Degree.69 The lack of a relevant rape by fraud
statutory provision appears to have limited KCPAO’s charges to those
instances of rape wherein the victims reported that they were incapacitated
by alcohol and, thus, unable to consent.70
Mr. Hickey denied all allegations of rape and claimed that the women
were “into it.”71 KCPAO responded that “[s]uch an excuse might be
believed with one rape or maybe even two, but after multiple situations in
which women have accused him of raping them when they were
intoxicated, the defendant’s excuses are no longer believable. . . . This
defendant is a danger to the community.”72
However, without the attendant alcohol,73 KCPAO would almost
certainly not have had the statutory language necessary to prosecute Mr.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. (initially reporting that six women accused Mr. Hickey of perpetrating a sexual scam
against them and raping them); Brownstone, Three Women Accuse Matt Hickey, supra note 59
(reporting that another three women accused Mr. Hickey of rape).
69. Info. at 1–2, State v. Hickey, No. 16-1-05400-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2016). “A person is guilty
of rape in the second degree when, under circumstances not constituting rape in the first degree, the
person engages in sexual intercourse with another person . . . [w]hen the victim is incapable of consent
by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated[.]” WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.050(1)
(b) (2016).
70. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.040, 9A.44.050, 9A.44.060. “‘Mental incapacity’ is that
condition existing at the time of the offense which prevents a person from understanding the nature or
consequences of the act of sexual intercourse whether that condition is produced by illness, defect, the
influence of a substance or from some other cause.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010(4). Washington
law provides that, for criminal rape convictions, mental incapacity, including incapacity caused by the
influence of a substance such as alcohol or drugs, may render a victim incapable of consenting to
sexual activity. Duvall v. Nelson, 387 P.3d 1158, 1166 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). Of note, KCPAO’s
limited charges may also have been affected by, for example, evidentiary concerns, internal policies,
and limited resources.
71. Prosecuting Attorney Case Summary and Request for Bail and/or Conditions of Release at
1, State v. Hickey, No. 16-1-05400-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2016).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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Hickey with criminal rape charges in connection with the sexual scam.74
Although Washington law provides limited protection against abuse of
power, sexual extortion (protecting only those with developmental
disabilities), and fraudulent healthcare treatment, it lacks statutory
language necessary to fully protect against sexual theft, sexual scams, and
impersonation.75 KCPAO prosecutor, Ms. Carla Carlstrom, noted that, in
cases like this, the defendant can simply say that the victims consented and
“[o]ften that’s why the state isn’t even able to file charges.”76
Indeed, despite having been accused by at least six women,77
KCPAO’s criminal rape charges were limited to three counts of Rape in
the Second Degree against three different women.78 However, KCPAO
accepted guilty pleas for four lesser charges: Indecent Liberties, two
counts of Assault in the Second Degree, and Assault in the Fourth
Degree.79 Mr. Hickey was given a 34-month sentence and placed on a sex
offender registry.80 KCPAO recommended a 30-month sentence, but after
hearing the victim statements at sentencing, Judge Roberts ordered Mr.
Hickey to a 34-month sentence.81 Judge Roberts demonstrated
Washington’s need for a flexible rape by fraud provision when she stated
that she would have sentenced him even longer but was “limited by the
law.”82
Additionally, the Washington State Attorney General’s Office
successfully charged Mr. Hickey with civil violations under both the
Consumer Protection Act and the Commercial Electronic Mailing Act,83
and the resulting default judgment against Mr. Hickey noted that at least
six women were subjected to Mr. Hickey’s sexual scam.84 The default
74. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.050(1)(c)(i)–(d). See generally Suliveres v. Commonwealth,
865 N.E.2d 1086, 1091 (Mass. 2007) (holding that a court may not interpret proof of fraudulent
coercion as a substitute for proof of force without corresponding statutory language).
75. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.050(1)(c)(i)–(d).
76. Sydney Brownstone, UPDATE: Porn Scammer and Sex Offender Matt Hickey Sentenced to
Nearly Three Years in Prison, STRANGER (Jan. 19, 2018, 2:20 PM) [hereinafter Brownstown, Matt
Hickey Sentenced], https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2018/01/19/25731442/porn-scammer-and-sexoffender-matt-hickey-sentenced-to-nearly-three-years-in-prison [https://perma.cc/6SYJ-DU9M].
77. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
78. Info. at 1–2, State v. Hickey, No. 16-1-05400-1 (Wash. 2016).
79. Presentence Statement of King County Prosecuting Attorney, State v. Hickey, No. 16-105400-1
(Wash.
Super.
Ct.
2017).
See
generally
WASH.
REV.
CODE
§§ 9A.44.100, 9A.36.021, 9A.36.041 (2016 & Supp. 2017).
80. Brownstown, Matt Hickey Sentenced, supra note 76.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 21, State v. Hickey, No. 16-2-30379-0 (Wash.
Super. Ct. 2016). See generally WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.020 (1961), 19.190.030 (1999).
84. Default Judgment at 8, State v. Hickey, No. 16-2-30379-0 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2016) (emphasis
added). Additionally, the default judgment ordered Mr. Hickey to pay $32,201.38 in costs and fees.
Id.
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judgment ordered Mr. Hickey to pay a civil penalty of $300,000.00, an
amount representing no less than 150 violations of the Consumer
Protection Act and the Commercial Electronic Mailing Act.85
Next, this Note examines criminal statutes drafted to protect against
the kind of sexual predation described above.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE REFORMATION

The American Law Institute (author of the Uniform Model Penal
Code) has advocated for criminal justice for victims of rape by fraud.86
The Model Penal Code’s “global consent provision” provides that
“[u]nless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the
offense, assent does not constitute consent if . . . it is induced by force,
duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining
the offense.”87
Additionally, twelve states have adopted rape statutes that provide
increased protections against rape by fraud.88 New Jersey and
Pennsylvania adopted in whole the Uniform Model Penal Code’s global
consent provision.89 Another eight states, Alabama, Colorado, Delaware,
Hawaii, Maine, Missouri, Montana, and North Dakota, adopted a global
consent provision functionally similar to the Uniform Model Penal
Code’s, providing that consent is ineffective “if it is induced by force,
duress or deception[.]”90 Texas and Tennessee adopted unique language
that is functionally similar to the Uniform Model Penal Code’s global
consent provision.91 In Texas, “[c]onsent is not effective if . . . induced by
force, threat, or fraud[.]”92 In Tennessee, “[r]ape is unlawful sexual
penetration of a victim by the defendant or of the defendant by a victim
[when] . . . [t]he sexual penetration is accomplished by fraud.”93
85. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
86. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(3)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
87. Id.
88. See Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Russell, Adult Impersonation: Rape by Fraud as a
Defense to Statutory Rape, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 75, 102 (2007).
89. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2–10(c)(3) (West 2018); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 311(C)(4) (West
2018).
90. ALA. CODE § 13A-2-7(c)(4) (2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-505(3)(d) (2017); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 453(4) (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-235(4) (2017); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 109(3)(C) (2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(5)(C) (West 2017); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-2211(2)(c) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-08(2)(c) (2017). For an example of a case effectively
utilizing the Uniform Model Penal Code’s global consent provision, see, for example, State v. Oshiro,
696 P.2d 846 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming defendant’s rape conviction because the defendant’s
deception vitiated the victim’s consent).
91. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(19) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(4)
(2016).
92. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(a)(19)–(a)(19)(A).
93. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503(a)–(a)(4); see also Falk, supra note 2, at 109–10.
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Additionally, in lieu of sexual penetration, Tennessee provides another
similar statute prohibiting sexual contact not amounting to sexual
penetration when accomplished by fraud.94
Notably, Tennessee created a nuanced, three-tiered, and gradated
statutory system for charging sexual assault offenses.95 First, and most
punitively, Tennessee’s aggravated rape and sexual battery statutes
prohibit unlawful penetration accompanied by the use of force or coercion
when a defendant is armed with a weapon, causes bodily injury, or has
accomplices.96 Second, and less punitively, Tennessee’s rape statute
provisions prohibit sex accomplished by fraud.97 Tennessee law also
provides that consent is vitiated if it is induced by deception.98 Third, and
least punitively, Tennessee’s sexual battery statute provisions prohibit
instances in which the defendant achieves nonconsensual sexual contact
but not penetration; the statute also protects against related sexual contact
accomplished by fraud.99
Tennessee demonstrated the effectiveness of its rape by fraud
statutory language in State v. Tizard.100 In Tizard, a teenage, male patient
had visited the defendant, a doctor, on several occasions, and the defendant
rubbed the patient’s genitals during several of the visits and stimulated the
patient to climax on one occasion.101
The court affirmed the defendant’s rape conviction because the
“defendant used his position as a treating physician with the intent to touch
the victim’s genitals solely for his sexual arousal or gratification, not for
medical purposes, and that the touching was accomplished under the guise
of medical examination . . . for the purpose of having the victim allow
such touching.”102 Moreover, the court held if a “physician intends to gain
access for nonmedical purposes, uses his position as a treating physician
for such purpose, and the patient allows such access because of a belief
that it is for medical purposes, we have no problem in concluding that the
physician perpetrates a fraud upon the patient[.]”103 The Tizard court
offered glowing praise for its state’s rape by fraud statutory reformation:

94. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-505(a)(2), (a)(4); see also Falk, supra note 2, at 109–10.
95. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-502, 39-13-503(a)(4), 39-13-504, 39-13-505(a)(2), (a)(4); see
also Falk, supra note 2, at 109–10.
96. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-502, 39-13-504; see also Falk, supra note 2, at 109.
97. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(4); see also Falk, supra note 2, at 109.
98. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(a)(9)(A); see also Falk, supra note 2, at 110.
99. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-505(a)(2), (a)(4); see also Falk, supra note 2, at 109–10.
100. State v. Tizard, 897 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
101. Id. at 736–37.
102. Id. at 742.
103. Id. at 743.
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We believe that the presently existing statutes cure the ills perceived
in [prior rape by fraud cases] by providing fraud, in its broad
meaning, as an alternative element to force or coercion for the
purposes of rape and sexual battery. Also, we are mindful that the
legislature, for the purposes of our criminal code, has provided that
consent is not effective when it is induced by deception.104

Next, this Note concludes that Washington should expand its rape
statutes and examines which expanded statutory provisions would provide
the best protection for Washington and similarly positioned states.
Additionally, this Note examines criticisms against adopting expansive
rape by fraud statutes.
III.

WASHINGTON SHOULD ADOPT EXPANDED RAPE BY FRAUD
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Washington should adopt expanded rape by fraud statutory
provisions similar to Tennessee’s provisions because they not only
provide improved victim protection but also provide gradated flexibility
that better comports the punitive quality of prosecutorial charges with the
severity of criminal offenses.105 Alternatively, Washington could
significantly increase its rape by fraud protection by simply adopting a
global consent provision—providing that consent is not effective if
induced by fraud or deception—similar to that of the Uniform Model Penal
Code and Texas.
Importantly, the power to expand rape by fraud statutory provisions
is the exclusive province of the legislature.106 However, during the 2016–
2017 legislative period, the Washington State Legislature introduced zero
bills with rape by fraud statutory provisions.107
The Legislature is free to amend the rape statute or create a new
substantive offense to encompass [rape by fraud], as many other
States have done. However, where the Legislature has chosen not to
do so, “[i]t is not for th[e] court . . . to rewrite the clear intention
expressed by the statute.”108
104. Id. at 742 (emphasis added).
105. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-502, 39-13-503(a)(4), 39-13-504, 39-13-505(a)(2), (a)(4);
see also Falk, supra note 2, at 109–10.
106. See Suliveres v. Commonwealth, 865 N.E.2d 1086, 1090 (Mass. 2007).
107. See Bills by Topic Results: Sex Offenses & Offenders, WASH. ST. LEGIS. (2017),
http://app.leg.wa.gov/billsbytopic/Results.aspx?letter=S&year=2017
[https://perma.cc/CW5QU6DU]. Numerous bills were proposed regarding sixty-two distinct issues related to sex offenses,
ranging from DNA testing to mandatory sexual assault awareness training for licensed cosmetologists,
but none of them offered rape by fraud statutory provisions. See id.
108. Suliveres, 865 N.E.2d at 1090 (quoting Mellor v. Berman, 454 N.E.2d 907, 913 (Mass.
1983)).
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Washington’s Rape Statutes Should Reflect Its Commitment to
Protecting Human Dignity and Women’s Equality

Washington should expand its statutory rape by fraud provisions to
better enhance and protect human dignity and women’s equality.109
Historically, law and society have relied on flawed justifications for
creating and enforcing rape statutes.110 “[R]ape is predominantly a male
social practice. As is law. To understand rape law, . . . we should seek to
understand why men pass laws that purport to outlaw the men who
rape.”111
The fundamental historical justification for rape law has been to
protect men’s property interests in women. The historical construction of
rape laws places women in a subordinate position as targets of men’s
sexuality.112 Indeed, the earliest recorded rape laws seemed to indicate that
the value of a woman’s body belonged not to her but to her father or
husband.113 In ancient Jewish law, the rape of a married woman was
punishable by death, but the rape of an unmarried woman was a civil
offense; it carried the penalty of “fifty shekels” to be paid to the victim’s
father, and the victim was required to marry the man who raped her.114
The flawed justification of protecting men’s property interests in
women is engrained in modern American jurisprudence. Famed jurist
Judge Richard Posner115 argued that all women, not just prostituted
women, commoditize their sexuality and exchange it for goods on a sexual
marketplace.116 Accordingly, rape statutes protect a marriage market
where women sell their property interest in bodily and sexual integrity to
would-be husbands.117
Of course, rhetoric that would commoditize sexuality as a fungible
good is irreparably flawed “because it detaches from the person that which
is integral to the person.”118 Nevertheless, Judge Posner recommends
perilously narrow rape statutes because he believes they advance
109. See Ben A. McJunkin, Deconstructing Rape by Fraud, 28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 44
(2014). “No State shall . . . deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
110. See McJunkin, supra note 109, at 22.
111. Id. at 2.
112. Id. at 32.
113. Keith Burgess-Jackson, A History of Rape Law, in A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 1, 1–17 (Keith Burgess-Jackson ed., 1999).
114. Id. at 16.
115. Judge Posner is one of the most influential judges in American history and is, in fact, the
most cited legal scholar of all time. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 401, 424 (2000).
116. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 202 (3d ed. 1986).
117. See id.
118. McJunkin, supra note 109, at 31 n.131 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1880–81 (1987)).
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economic efficiency: “Girls are taught by their parents to be suspicious of
the blandishments of suitors; and the careful screening of suitors is the
essence of the optimal female sexual strategy.”119
Judge Posner’s commentary highlights the degree to which rape laws
have not been conceived for the paramount interests of promoting human
dignity and women’s equality. “[T]he institution of rape law mirrors the
macro-discourse of pop-culture seduction—men’s pursuit; women’s
choice.”120 Throughout history, narrow rape laws have supported the
interests of the powerful by legitimizing their pursuit of the less
powerful.121 Today, narrow rape laws tacitly endorse a contractual model
of sex that underscores that “it is permissible for men to try to attain sexual
gratification for themselves . . . and it is the woman’s role to play
‘gatekeeper’ if she so desires.”122
Even with respect to the expansion of rape by fraud statutes, statutory
provisions protecting against spousal impersonation have been used to
reinforce and preserve male power and the property interests of husbands
and boyfriends.123 Uniquely, spousal impersonation often renders nonconsent virtually impossible because social customs exert enormous
pressure on women to make themselves sexually available to their
husbands.124 Thus, “[f]or men, the resulting sexual conquest [of spousal
impersonation] is seen as illegitimate” because it negatively impacts the
property interests of husbands and boyfriends.125 In other words, the
opprobrium male-dominated law attached to spousal impersonation exists
not because of rape’s catastrophic effect on human dignity and women’s
equality but because of rape’s depreciative effect on men’s so-called
property—their wives and girlfriends.126

119. See RICHARD POSNER, SEX & REASON 393 (1992); see also McJunkin, supra note 109, at
33.
120. McJunkin, supra note 109, at 31.
121. See id. at 32; Burgess-Jackson, supra note 113 and accompanying text.
122. See McJunkin, supra note 109, at 32 (quoting ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL
RELATIONS 196, 212 (1999)).
123. Id.
124. See McJunkin, supra note 109, at 35 n.149; Robin West, Sex, Law, and Consent, in THE
ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 236 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wetrheimer eds., 2010)
[hereinafter West, Sex, Law, and Consent]. Despite criminal laws prohibiting spousal rape in all fifty
states, statutory deterrence is inadequate in several states. See Samantha Allen, Marital Rape is SemiLegal in 8 States, DAILY BEAST (June 9, 2015, 2:15 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2015/06/09/marital-rape-is-semi-legal-in-8-states.html [https://perma.cc/29Z8-QBTW]. In
South Carolina, spousal rape can only be accomplished through aggravated force, and the rape must
be reported within thirty days. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-315(a)–(b) (2015) (emphasis added).
125. See West, Sex, Law, and Consent, supra note 124, at 35.
126. See id.
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Perhaps less insidiously, Washington’s inadequate rape statutes
reflect popular, romanticized notions of seduction and sexuality.127 Some
critics view rape by fraud statutes as tantamount to the criminalization of
boyish charms and courtship embellishments. Professor Jed Rubenfeld of
Yale Law School wrote that “deceptive sex, however bad it may be, isn’t
that bad.”128 Beyond mere legal commentary, consider the judicial opinion
of this New York trial judge Judge Edward Greenfield:
So bachelors, and other men on the make, fear not. It is still not illegal
to feed a girl a line, to continue the attempt, not to take no for a final
answer, at least not the first time. . . . Every man is free, under the
law, to be a gentleman or a cad.129

The sheer absurdity of these comments and opinions is obvious when
considered against the reality of Ms. Bishop’s perilous experience
attempting suicide after having been conned by Mr. Hickey in his sexual
scam.130 Moreover, compare Judge Greenfield’s commentary with the
default judgment against Mr. Hickey in Washington’s consumer rights
violation case:
As a result of [Mr. Hickey’s] conduct, these women suffered harm,
including loss of job opportunity, time, effort, money, and an
intangible loss of bodily integrity and privacy. Women continue to
suffer loss of privacy because Hickey currently maintains sole control
of photos that were obtained through his business scam.131

Washington’s criminal rape statutes should embody the commitment
to women’s equality and human dignity exemplified by its consumer
protection laws in the judgment against Mr. Hickey.
b.

Overcoming Criticism Against Rape by Fraud Statutory
Provisions

This Note now considers arguments against expanded rape by fraud
statutory provisions, including popular traditionalist and feminist
objections.

127. See McJunkin, supra note 109, at 34–35.
128. Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122
YALE L.J. 1372, 1416 (2013) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception].
129. People v. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 922 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (emphasis added).
130. Compare Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception, supra note 128, and Evans, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 922, with supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text (describing the suffering a woman
endured because of a Seattle sex scam, including an attempt to take her own life).
131. Default Judgment at 8, State v. Hickey, No. 16-2-30379-0 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2016).
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Traditionalist Objections to Rape by Fraud Statutory Provisions

Legal scholar and educator, Ms. Vivian Berger, suggested that many
of the men engaged in sexual theft are despicable characters but should not
be considered rapists.132 Ms. Berger explained that she has “minimal
sympathy for the idea that the law should protect, via criminal sanctions,
the cheated expectations of women who sought to sleep their way to the
top but discovered, too late, that they were dealing with swindlers.”133 In
short, this view is that sexual theft may be bad, but it is not so bad as to
merit criminal sanction.
Legal scholar and educator, Mr. Donald Dripps, argued that the
expansion of rape by fraud statutory provisions would violate public
policy by using the state to enforce quasi-contracts for illegal
prostitution.134 In short, this view is that the law should not be a payment
enforcement mechanism for illegal financial activity related to prostituted
persons.
However, these arguments misunderstand the scope of rape by fraud
statutory provisions and fail to appreciate the humanity and vulnerability
of sex workers. Ms. Berger’s dehumanizing rhetoric advances the “myth
or stereotype that a prostitute’s consent to sex is less worthy of protection
at criminal law than is that of other wom[e]n.”135 “If anyone needs criminal
protections against material fraud, street sex workers do.”136 Perhaps “the
real reason not to recognize rape (or battery) under these circumstances is
that society often views the prostitute’s behavior as immoral and
illegal.”137 Regarding Mr. Dripp’s objection, the rape by fraud statutory
provisions recommended by this Note would not guarantee financial
exchanges between buyers and prostituted women—rather, the provisions
would work to guarantee the equal protection of vulnerable prostituted
women and children from the predatory opportunism facilitated by
existing law.

132. See Vivian Berger, Not So Simple Rape, 7 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 69, 76–77 (1988); see also
J. R. Broughton, The Criminalization of Consensual Adult Sex after Lawrence, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 125 (2014).
133. Berger, supra note 132, at 76.
134. See Donald Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of
Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1803 (1992); see also Kim Shayo
Buchanan, Rape by Fraud 20 (working paper 2015) (on file with the author).
135. Canada’s Justice Marry Ellen Turpel-Lafond writing in R. v. Gartner, [2003] S.J. No. 825,
para. 30 (Prov. Ct.) (Can.); see also Buchanan, supra note 134, at 20.
136. Buchanan, supra note 134, at 21.
137. See Falk, supra note 2, at 79.
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Feminist Concerns about Rape by Fraud Statutory Provisions

Some prominent feminist scholars are skeptical of rape by fraud
legislation because they believe it tends to make “it more difficult for
women to promulgate new images of female sexuality.”138 Other feminist
scholars are concerned that rape by fraud legislative schemes tend to
exclude vulnerable sex workers from their protection.139
First, the purpose of rape by fraud legislation should not be to restrict
female sexuality; it should be to expand female sexuality beyond the
constructed role of buyer and seller on a so-called sexual marketplace.140
Next, Washington can and should articulate an intention to protect
vulnerable sex workers from sexual thievery without endorsing or
legitimizing prostitution. Because of the stigma so widely attached to
prostitution, victims of sexual theft often lack both social support and legal
recourse.141 The Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network commented that the
“criminalization [of prostitution] reinforces the stigma associated with
prostitution and pushes sex workers to the margins of society[.]”142 In turn,
this “reinforces the attitude that sex workers ‘deserve what they get’ when
they are beaten up or murdered [and] creates an environment in which
brutal forms of exploitation of sex workers can take root[.]”143
The exploitation of vulnerable sex workers is, in part, facilitated by
a legal system that has routinely failed to offer its protections to sex
workers. Indeed, apart from the lack of criminal protections examined
above, even the highly influential Restatement (Second) of Torts bluntly
advocates for a denial of recourse for prostituted victims of fraud:
1. A, to induce B to submit to intimate familiarities, offers her a
paper which A represents to be a twenty dollar bill but which he
knows to be counterfeit. B, believing the paper to be a genuine bill,
submits. A is not liable to B for battery.
2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that the paper is
offered if B will submit to a blood transfusion. A is subject to liability
to B for the harm done by the operation to which A has fraudulently
induced him to submit.144

138. Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 304, 313–14 (1995); see also Buchanan, supra note 134, at 26 n.193.
139. See Buchanan, supra note 134, at 27; see also supra notes 132–133 and accompanying text;
infra note 144 and accompanying text.
140. But see POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 116, at 202.
141. See Falk, supra note 2, at 76–77.
142. CAN. HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, SEX, WORK, RIGHTS: CHANGING CANADA’S CRIMINAL
LAWS TO PROTECT SEX WORKERS’ HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 14 (2005).
143. Id.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 57 cmt. a, illus. 1 & 2 (1965) (emphasis added).
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Washington law should not condone the use of fraud to coercively
obtain sexual intercourse.145 “It is time to understand the law of rape
differently. . . . The use or threat of physical violence is just one way
men force women they know to have sex with them.”146 “Men also use
other kinds of threats, such as to leave women stranded, to publicly
humiliate them, and to fire them from their jobs.”147 “Threats and
deceptions that would be prohibited by laws against extortion, fraud,
or false pretenses as a way to obtain money should be prohibited by
rape law as a way to obtain sex.”148 Washington should “let go of the
sexism of the past, and . . . condemn, not condone, coerced and
nonconsensual sex.”149
CONCLUSION
Washington should reform its rape laws to protect against rape by
fraud, a form of sexual predation not always criminally prosecutable under
existing Washington rape statutes. Twelve pioneering states and the
Uniform Model Penal Code have identified legislative solutions, the best
of which is Tennessee’s statutory scheme because of its gradated
flexibility. The adoption of expanded rape by fraud statutory provisions
would not only improve Washington’s ability to protect against abuse of
power, sexual extortion, and fraudulent treatment, but it would also create
new criminal law protections against sexual theft, sexual scams, and
impersonation.
Statutory provisions that protect against rape by fraud enhance
human dignity and safeguard women’s equality. Although some critics are
worried that the adoption of Tennessee’s rape by fraud statutory scheme
would be tantamount to a state endorsement of prostitution, Washington
has a paramount obligation to extend equal protection of the law to sex
workers. In doing so, Washington does not have to endorse or facilitate
illegal sex work. Additionally, other scholars are concerned that rape by
fraud statutory provisions may restrict female sexual expression.
However, Washington can overcome this by using expanded rape by fraud
statutory language to enhance and protect female sexuality, challenging
the perception that women’s sexuality is a mere commodity on a sexual
marketplace. Finally, other scholars are concerned that rape by fraud
statutory provisions would not protect prostituted women, but Washington
can and should recognize the humanity and vulnerability of sex workers—
and it can do so without securing related illegal exchanges.
145. Janet E. Findlater, Reexamining the Law of Rape, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1356, 1364 (1988).
146. Id. at 1363.
147. Id. at 1364.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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Although Tennessee’s statutory scheme is the most nuanced model
available, Washington could craft legislation tailored to its unique needs
or adopt select provisions from other states and models. Importantly,
expansion of this law is not the province of the judiciary—only the
legislature can remedy the inadequacies of Washington’s current rape
statutes. The Washington legislature should adopt expansive rape by fraud
provisions to protect against the broad range of fraudulent and dishonest
conduct used to obtain sexual complicity.

